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The deregulation of dairy marketing that occurred on 1 July 2000 is a fascinating
case study in microeconomic reform. The role of interacting industry and institutional
features in the movement to deregulation is explained, with political realities being
recognised. A key part of the deregulation bundle was an unprecedented “struc-
tural adjustment” package valued at about one and a half billion dollars (in
1998–1999). Questions are raised about the rationale for this package, the process of




The dairy industry was long one of the most highly assisted and regulated
industries in Australia. The effective rates of assistance in 1999–2000 were
19 per cent for manufacturing milk and more than 200 per cent for market
milk, compared with an average effective rate of assistance for the entire
agricultural sector of 6 per cent (Productivity Commission 2001a). Because
of the regulation Australia had six separate dairy industries, one in each
state, rather than a national industry. Further, within each state there was
an artiﬁcial separation of market milk and manufacturing milk. This frag-
mentation of the national market was precisely what the founding fathers,
who saw federation removing barriers to trade between the colonies and
establishing a common Australian market, sought a century ago to end.
All this changed on 1 July 2000. July 1 was D-day – deregulation day!
This day saw the end of monopoly marketing for table milk by the state
government statutory marketing authorities. That meant not only the intro-
duction of competition to areas where many elderly farmers, government
ofﬁcials and commercially-oriented employees in value-adding ﬁrms had
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known only its absence, but also the abolition of longstanding institutions.
The separate Domestic Market Support (DMS) scheme for manufacturing
milk, an ingenious regulatory creation of the Commonwealth Government,
also ended on 30 June, 2000.
With marketing deregulation, the strong tendency for prices for all
Australian milk to be pulled towards its international price – the value of
milk in making butter, cheese and other products for export – could exert
itself. This key characteristic of a competitive Australian milk market was
thwarted under regulation.
In the present paper I try to tell the story of how deregulation came
about. A sufﬁcient reason for doing this is that the story of deregulation is
a fascinating and complex one, with several interacting industry and insti-
tutional factors at work. These make the dairy industry a very interesting
case study in deregulation – as it had earlier been an interesting study in
regulation.
A feature of the deregulation bundle is an unprecedented ‘structural




1.5 billion dollars in 1998–1999
prices. The rationale for this package, the process of determining it, and the
means of funding it warrant questioning – both from the view of assessing
the efﬁcacy of the package provided to the dairy industry, and from the
view of possible relevance of the dairy model to policy for the remaining
highly protected areas of manufacturing.
In the following sections of the paper an outline is ﬁrst provided of the
complex regulatory interventions in the dairy industry. Then an account is
given of how deregulation was achieved. Questions of interest in that account
include the roles of the Commonwealth and State Governments in the deregu-
lation process and the part played by National Competition Policy. Here and
elsewhere the political context is not neglected. The penultimate section
comprises some questions that arise in thinking about dairy deregulation
in a public policy context. Those questions relate especially to the large
structural adjustment package, facilitated by the Commonwealth Government
at the request of the dairy industry. Finally, there is a concluding comment.
 
2. Regulation of the dairy industry
 
The outline of regulation is provided ﬁrst for market milk and then for
manufacturing milk.
 
2.1 Market milk: State Governments help farmers milk consumers
 
The State Governments, which under Australia’s Constitution have respons-
ibility for price controls and food quality, are the main policy makers for 
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the market milk – also called table milk or fresh milk – sector. They license
dairy farmers to produce milk and they regulate milk quality. Statutory
Marketing Authorities (SMA) were established in each state to administer
the regulation of the market milk sector. In Victoria, the SMA was the
Victorian Dairy Industry Authority and in New South Wales it was the NSW
Dairy Corporation. These bodies had a monopoly on the primary-level
marketing of milk in their states and traditionally they regulated milk
marketing at subsequent stages of the chain. Except in Queensland and
South Australia, the SMA had vesting power (i.e., ownership of milk passed
to the SMA, usually at the farm-gate) over all milk production, although
this power was not exercised in all states (Industry Commission 1991a).
The State Governments set farmer prices for market milk well above export
parity – approximately 21 cents a litre higher on average, or approximately














prices up was an effective way to transfer income from consumers to milk
producers – not that this was a speciﬁed objective of the various state acts.













A reviewer suggested that when statutory price discrimination in milk marketing was
introduced in the 1930s a price premium for that milk may have been warranted by the
higher sanitary standards applying to it than to milk for manufacturing and by higher costs
of year-round milk production. In recent times, however, there has been no difference at
farm-gate in the characteristics of milk destined for table use and milk for manufacturing,
so there has been no economic rationale for a price difference at farm-gate.
Table 1 Net subsidy equivalent for dairying
Manufacturing milk (#m) Market milk (#m) Total milk (#m)
a
1990–1991 171 412 583
1991–1992 150 386 535
1992–1993 122 260 382
1993–1994 117 264 380
1994–1995 130 326 455
1995–1996 167 323 490
1996–1997 170 384 554
1997–1998 140 374 514
1998–1999 143 310 453
1999–2000 152 311 463
a Previous columns may not add exactly to total due to rounding.
Source: Productivity Commission (2000). 
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With the price for market milk held so high, it was necessary to have a
means of rationing farmers’ access to this lucrative market. Australia-wide,
market milk sales account for approximately 18 per cent of total milk pro-
duction (see Table 2). In Victoria, which produces more than 60 per cent of
Australia’s milk, only 6 per cent goes to the high-priced market milk outlet.
In NSW, the next biggest producer with 13 per cent of national production,
approximately 43 per cent is sold as market milk.
Victoria used a system of ‘equitable marketing’ to allocate the large-
price premium for fresh milk proportionately to all farmers. Under that
system, each farmer was paid as though 6 per cent of his/her milk entered
the fresh milk market and 94 per cent the manufacturing market. This
approach was used also in other states, Tasmania and South Australia,
where market milk is a small proportion of total milk production. This
‘equalised price’ approach encouraged farmers to produce more milk than
the efﬁcient amount, but because the inﬂuence of the market milk compon-
ent on price was small, the excess production was relatively small.
In New South Wales, and also Queensland and Western Australia, where
market milk approaches half of total production, market milk quotas were
used. Farmers needed to have quota to obtain access to the premiums avail-
able for fresh milk. In NSW these quotas were tradeable, with some restric-
tions, since the start of the 1990s; previously quota was attached to
individual parcels of dairy land, and had to be transferred with the land.
For many NSW dairy farmers the value of their milk quota was several
hundred thousand dollars – a strong reason to oppose deregulation of
farm-gate market milk prices.
The SMA used their monopoly powers to restrict interstate trade in milk,
which would have undermined the market-milk premiums. More is said
later about how that was done.










NSW 596 799 1 395 43
Vic 440 6 430 6 870 6
Qld 383 465 848 45
SA 185 528 713 26
WA 190 222 412 46
Tas 48 561 609 8
Aust 1 936 8 911 10 847 18
Source: Australian Dairy Corporation (2001). †Milk traded interstate is excluded from state ﬁgures and
included in national ﬁgure. 
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The pricing policies of state governments also hindered innovations in
marketing. For example, the growth in the use of milk treated at ultra high
temperatures (UHT milk) to extend shelf-life, was retarded by the policy of
selling it to milk processors at prices in excess of those for manufacturing





The idea of the State Governments attaching the milking machines to
consumers’ pockets and siphoning the proceeds to dairy farmers is an apt
metaphor for longstanding market-milk policies in each state. The price-
inelastic demand for market milk made it well-suited to price discrimination.
In the most insightful analysis undertaken of Australia’s agricultural pricing
policies, Sieper (1982) spoke of farmers ‘owning their domestic demand
curve’, meaning governments were well disposed to intervening to allow
farmers to extract the economic rents available with regulated departures
from competition in the presence of inelastic demand.
It should be noted that the heavy regulatory regime for market milk
existed until the end of June 2000 only for farmer prices. The previous
regulation of milk marketing beyond the farm-gate was gradually removed
in all states over the previous two decades. That regulation had included





2.2 Manufacturing milk: the Commonwealth helps with the milking
 

















before the last quarter of the twentieth century, restrict substitutes.
It is the Commonwealth Government that has been the key legislator for
policy for manufacturing milk. This is because of the Commonwealth’s




In the late 1990s milk for UHT could be sourced at the manufacturing milk price in
Western Australia, making it proﬁtable to transport UHT milk from there to the eastern




Another reviewer noted that in New South Wales and perhaps in the other quota states,
regulation of the distribution margins was very important, and that there is an argument




© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003
 
However, production quotas for margarine, lifted in the mid-1970s, were




The focus here is on the period from 1 July 1986. On that date the Kerin
plan came into existence. The essence of the price support mechanism




A levy (tax) was paid by farmers on all milk, market milk as well as




The proceeds of the tax were distributed to farmers as an export subsidy
on manufactured dairy products.
If 50 per cent of milk was used in export produce, a levy of 2 cents a litre
on all milk could fund a subsidy of 4 cents a litre on milk exported in
manufactured products. By making it proﬁtable for ﬁrms exporting dairy
products to divert sales from the domestic market, the export subsidy raised
the price farmers received domestically, as well as for exports.
Industry leaders saw this DMS arrangement as an ‘industry-funded’
export subsidy and distinguished it from a conventional taxpayer-funded
export subsidy. The reality was that the levy was largely passed on to
domestic consumers of milk and manufactured dairy products. Moreover,
domestic consumers of manufactured products experienced a price rise as a
result of the subsidy component of the package, just as they would have if
the revenue to pay the subsidy had been raised in other ways.
Because Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia used most of their milk
for manufacturing for export, DMS involved a transfer to those states of









91 million of net payments from DMS
accrued to Victoria (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport
References Committee 1999). Tasmania and SA received the remainder of
the net payments, while the market milk states together made a small net
payment rather than receiving one. The existence of the interstate transfer to
manufacturing milk states that was built into DMS, was probably a major
factor in Victoria not moving into the big New South Wales fresh-milk
market years ago. That move would have caused New South Wales to be
less supportive of DMS, making it less likely to have lasted as long as it did.
To the uninitiated it might seem that the Kerin plan was a poor deal for
farmers in New South Wales and Queensland. This is not so. Another feature
of the Kerin package was the ‘comfort clause’, allowing a state whose




The Commonwealth contributed to restricting the competition faced by butter from
margarine by introducing in 1940 the requirement that imports contain alkanet root, giving
the spread an unappetising pink appearance (Lloyd 1982). 
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communicate to the Commonwealth that it should terminate the all-milk
levy, which would end the price supports for manufactured milk. The
comfort clause was part of the political deal to get the support of New South





The Kerin plan provided for progressive reductions in the level of price
support for manufactured dairy products to the level of import parity for
competing products from New Zealand.
Mauldon (1990) pointed out that the Kerin plan involved a more efﬁcient
application than previously of the tax/subsidy approach to supporting prices,
so that domestic prices for manufactured products were related more
closely to world prices. (Previously there had been differential price support
across manufactured products; differential support for a given product sold
in low-price and high-price export markets; equalisation of prices for manu-
factured products in the domestic and export markets; and pooling of
some marketing costs through a system of ‘allowances’). Because it imposed
a uniform tax on all milk, the Kerin plan reduced the regulated separation
of the liquid and manufacturing milk sectors.
It needs to be appreciated that the Kerin plan was not imposed unilater-
ally by the Commonwealth, although the necessary legislation was the
responsibility of the Commonwealth Government. The plan, like other
developments in policy for the manufacturing sector before and since 1986,
was the product of extensive discussion and politicking between the state and
Commonwealth agriculture ministers in the regular meetings of the Agri-
cultural and Resource Management Council of Australia and New Zealand.
Subsequent developments in manufacturing milk policy announced by
Federal Primary Industries Minister Simon Crean in April 1992 continued
the phasing down of market support of the Kerin plan and retained the levy/
subsidy principle, although there were some administrative changes. Import-
antly, Minister Crean announced that the DMS scheme would end on 30 June
2000, with no legislated support for manufacturing milk beyond that date.
Further changes in the DMS arrangements after the Uruguay round of
multilateral trade negotiations, and operative from 1 July 1995, were
announced by Bob Collins – Simon Crean’s successor in the Primary
Industries portfolio – with the statement, ‘Australia has met and exceeded
its Uruguay Round export subsidy commitments on dairy products by




The comfort clause was invoked twice by New South Wales in 1987, when milk from
Victoria was sold in New South Wales at less than prescribed prices. But talks between the
dairy industry authorities in the two states resulted in a limit on the volume of Victorian
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The Industry Commission said the replacement arrangement ‘is not tech-
nically an export subsidy in terms of the GATT but provides a similar level
of incentive to export, and of assistance to manufacturing dairy products’
(Industry Commission 1995). The ‘rejigged’ policy was queried by the
USA, Japan and New Zealand (Personal communication, Department of Agri-
culture, Fisheries and Forestry). The absence of a formal protest through
the WTO may have been due to strategic considerations in association with
the planned ‘sunsetting’ of the DMS scheme in mid-2000.
An unintentional effect of DMS was to make it more attractive for other
countries to export dairy products to Australia. This was of special signiﬁc-
ance for New Zealand, with whom Australia had a free trade agreement.
With the liberalisation of dairy trade between New Zealand and Australia,
imports from New Zealand displaced Australian sales in the domestic
market. This development was facilitated by New Zealand’s single-desk
exporting set-up. It forced extra Australian produce onto the export market,
reducing the rate of export subsidy that could be provided from a given levy
on milk production. The interaction between Australia’s price supports for










7 million a year from liberalisation of trans-Tasman dairy trade,




21 million to consumers being outweighed by a liberalisation-




28 million because of the price support to New Zealand
producers. However, it is reasonable to judge that Australia’s international
agreement with New Zealand contributed more to competition in the dairy
market than did Section 92 – the ‘free trade clause’ – of the Constitution.
 
3. Move to a deregulated market
 
The Kerin plan of 1986 set in train a series of developments that culminated
in deregulation of the manufacturing and market milk sectors 14 years
later. The commitment to phasing down assistance for the manufacturing
sector of the dairy industry in the Kerin plan reﬂected the economic ration-
alism of the Hawke Labor governments. It was consistent with reductions
in protection initiated in other rural industries and in manufacturing. The
reduction in assistance was a signiﬁcant development, which had implica-
tions for the market milk sector also, although industry leaders and state




Instead of taxing all milk and subsidising exports of manufactured products as under
the Crean (and Kerin) plans, the Collins adjustment exempted milk used in manufacturing for
export from tax, and used the tax revenue to subsidise production of all manufacturing milk. 
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Not all developments post-Kerin plan were deregulatory, however. The
comfort clause, outlined earlier, was discontinued under the Crean plan.
That reﬂected not a liberalisation of thinking on interstate trade in milk,
but the development of alternative, more effective means of restricting such
ﬂows. Because of concerns about the effectiveness of the comfort clause,
the Victorian Government in November 1987 had amended Section 38 of
the Victorian Dairy Industry Authority Act 1984. The amendment made
Victorian milk processors wanting to sell milk interstate pay the market-
milk price for it. As the Industry Commission (1991a) said, ‘The amendment
effectively removed the incentive for Victorian processors to trade pro-
cessed milk interstate and so helped preserve the beneﬁts to New South
Wales dairy farmers from their higher priced fresh milk market’. Other
states, apart from Western Australia, had equivalent ‘Section 38’ provisions
(New South Wales Government Review Group 1997).
Interestingly, the Attorney General’s Department advised the Industry
Commission that it considered the use of Section 38 legislation to be con-
trary to Section 92 of the Constitution (Industry Commission 1991b). Why
did an enterprising milk processor not challenge the legislation? Part of the
answer may lie in the cost of litigation. But part lies in the reality that a
processor doing this would have been viewed not as enterprising, but as
traitorous by large numbers of farmers in Victoria, New South Wales and
elsewhere who would have seen, accurately, the threat of prices for all milk
falling to the unsupported manufacturing-price level.
The Industry Commission, whose 1991 report was an input into the
Crean plan, emphasised the need for the price of market milk to fall relat-
ive to the price of manufacturing milk before the end of the DMS scheme.









and supply quotas by July 1999 – which would have effectively
eliminated the value of quotas in New South Wales, Queensland and Western
Australia. That course found no attraction with the industry or state govern-
ments, and was not followed.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the decision to phase down and end price
support for manufacturing milk foreshadowed the likely ending of regula-
tion for market milk. What incentive would Victoria have to stay out of
interstate table milk markets once it lost the net transfer to its farmers
under the DMS scheme?
 
3.1 National Competition Policy process
 
The continuation of the prized market-milk premium was therefore doubt-
ful even before all states, territories and the Commonwealth entered the
Competition Principles Agreement (CPA) in 1995, committing to review all 
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laws restricting competition by 2000. The guiding principle for reviews
under the CPA was that competition should not be restricted unless it









The beneﬁts of the legislation could only be achieved by restricting
competition.
These are tough tests for regulatory legislation to pass, although the absence
of an agreed common approach in undertaking reviews makes them less
tough. The National Competition Council (NCC), responsible for overseeing





ciple underpinning the NCP is that reform should be introduced when it
serves the overall community interest’ (NCC 1999). Further, ‘The NCP does
not prescribe what constitutes the community interest, but rather recognises
that it can encompass a range of possible factors that are likely to vary
from case-to-case’.




Dairy Industry Act 1992 under the NCP was
carried out by the Centre for International Economics (CIE), a prominent
















Ensuring standards of public health and consumer protection.
The CIE saw policies to achieve the ﬁrst three objectives being against the




It reached this conclusion using standard social
cost beneﬁt analysis. However, CIE did see a large net community beneﬁt in
a statutory dairy industry-speciﬁc food safety body.
The CIE’s recommendation to deregulate marketing at the farm-gate level
was perhaps easier to reach and certainly to implement, due to the support
for deregulation by the main dairy farmer organisation (the United Dairy
Farmers of Victoria Association), and by the value-adding sector – the
market milk processors and export-oriented manufacturers – and it was
accepted by the Kennett government in July 1999. The industry saw the
gains from reduced costs in farming and value-adding with deregulation,
and from opportunities to sell market milk interstate, offsetting the loss of
revenue from the market-milk premium.
This was the opposite decision to the one reached earlier in New South
Wales (New South Wales Government Review Group 1997). The New
South Wales review team, comprising a majority of members who saw their
allegiance to the dairy industry or the Minister for Agriculture, had split on 
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whether the farm-gate price regulation and supply controls was in the
public interest, the industry-based majority ﬁnding that it was. The majority
in the New South Wales review report put much weight on favourable
regional income effects of regulation in dairying regions, disregarding off-
setting effects elsewhere. The New South Wales government accepted the
Review Group’s majority recommendation to retain the price regulation
and quota arrangements.
The other states in their NCP reviews of market milk regulation recog-
nised the inevitability of deregulation as a result of the pro-deregulation
forces in Victoria, but they sought to delay its introduction.
Under the NCP, much leeway is left to the states to decide how they con-
duct their reviews. The freedom to determine the composition of review
groups is an important element of this. It is unlikely that a review of the
New South Wales Act would have produced the same recommendations
had it been undertaken by CIE. By contrast, given the support for deregu-
lation by the dairy industry in the Victorian review, a (Victorian) industry-
dominated review of the Victorian dairy industry legislation would likely
have led to the same outcome as the CIE review did.
Given the composition of the New South Wales Review Group, it was
probably inevitable that it would not be able to reach agreement on their
recommendations. The diverse interests of group members was somewhat
reminiscent of that for members of the Sugar Industry Task Force set up by
Primary Industries Minister Simon Crean in April 1992 to help him decide
how to respond to an Industry Commission report with a deregulatory
thrust (Edwards 1993). Unlike the sugar task force, however, the New
South Wales Review Group included members from the Cabinet Ofﬁce and
the Treasury who might be expected to see consumer interests as important.
The National Competition Council was critical of the New South Wales
review: ‘The Council has some concerns with this review, given the differ-
ences of view between the dairy industry representatives and the independent
members advocating reform, and is pursuing these with NSW’ (NCC 1999).
In the event, deﬁciencies in the New South Wales review process were
downgraded in policy-relevance with the subsequent Victorian decision,
which forced deregulation on the other eastern mainland states.
 
3.2 Structural adjustment package
 
During and following the Victorian review there was much political activity
directed to winning ﬁnancial assistance for dairy farmers in association
with deregulation. In the course of this interaction the Federal Government
asked the dairy industry, through the Australian Dairy Industry Council
(ADIC), to consider options for its future. The ADIC accepted, before the 
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end of the Victorian review, that the winding up of DMS and commercial
pressures made deregulation of market milk inevitable, and that the priority
was to achieve it in an orderly manner. On 28 September 1999 the Federal




Warren Truss said, ‘The
Government had been approached by the dairy industry for support for a




1.8 billion structural adjustment package for the dairy industry, should all
States decide to make deregulation legislative changes from 1 July, 2000 …
the package would assist restructure of the industry by helping farmers








1.6 billion of the package comprises payments under the
Dairy Structural Adjustment Program (DSAP) to those in dairy farming on
28 September 1999. Payments are at the rate of 46.23c per litre on farmers’
deliveries of market milk in 1998–1999 and for manufacturing milk, on a
fat and protein basis, a national average of 8.96c a litre on 1998–1999 deliver-
ies. The legislation provides for payments to be made in quarterly instal-





 Almost half the total payments go to Victoria, while
New South Wales receives about one-ﬁfth – 
 
#582 million and #259 million
respectively in 1998–1999 prices (see Table 3). The average payment to
dairy farmers in New South Wales and Victoria under the package is estim-
ated at #143 000 and #72 000, respectively, in 1998–1999 prices. The larger
payments per farm in New South Wales reﬂect the greater importance of
the more highly supported market milk outlet for farmers in that state.
7 The ADIC’s original proposal in April 1999 was for a package of #1.25 billion, to be bor-
rowed commercially by the industry using a discretionary trust and repaid with the proceeds
of a levy (excise tax) on all market milk. The proposal was that the payments to farmers be non-
taxable. Senator Troeth, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Agriculture, explained
why that proposal could not be enacted by the Government, ‘We were not prepared to set
a precedent under tax law and provide tax-free payments. Recognising the large tax impost
that would be associated with a lump sum payment and against the background that a
single up-front payment would be illegal under WTO arrangements [preventing Australia
meeting its committed reductions in its Aggregate Measure of Support], the government
agreed to payments being over eight years to ease the tax burden on recipients. The agree-
ment to #1.74 billion is an approximation in present value terms of the original #1.25
billion single payment proposal’ (Troeth 2000). The part of the Government in determining
dairy industry policy was elucidated as follows, ‘The government’s role ... has been to
facilitate the process, to listen to the industry, to hear what it had to say and then put into
place a workable operation which would provide industry with what it needs’ (Troeth 2000).
8 Independently of the Government, ADIC initiated a competitive tender process for a
commercial industry facility to allow farmers to borrow against the security of their
restructure payments (ADIC 2000). The Commonwealth Bank was chosen as the provider
of this facility, which is the ADIC-endorsed way, although not the only way, for dairy farmers
to receive their DSAP payments up-front.Deregulation in dairy industry 87
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There were two other components of the package. First, exit payments of
up to #45 000 were made available for farmers choosing to leave dairying.
Second, late in the passage of the legislation, a Dairy Regional Assistance
Program (DRAP) was added, providing #45 million over three years to help
dairy-dependent communities affected by deregulation.
9
In his second reading speech, Minister Truss (2000) said, ‘This package is
not about providing compensation for removal of quotas and regulation,
or about providing income support’. Rather, the package was said to be
about facilitating adjustment, and improving industry performance – which,
in turn, were seen as increasing employment and incomes in regional dairy-
ing areas.
The funding of the adjustment package is not from consolidated revenue,
but by a ‘levy’ of 11 cents a litre on all retail milk sales for 8 years.
In present value terms, the adjustment package was equivalent to approxim-
ately three recent years of transfers to dairy farmers, as shown in Table 1.
Although the package was criticised as inadequate by dairy farmers in some
states, especially New South Wales and Queensland, all eventually accepted
it. It was clear to the realists that the choice was between deregulation with
a package and deregulation without. Only in Western Australia did the state
government decide to make a substantial supplementary contribution to
offsetting the effects of deregulation on dairy farmers.
On 21 May 2001, Warren Truss announced a #140 million supplementary
package of assistance for dairy farmers and dairy communities most
9 Senator Michael Forshaw (Labor, NSW) pointed out that #1.5 million from DRAP
went to a meatworks at Gympie, in the electorate of the Minister for Agriculture, #220 000
to developing a polocrosse ﬁeld and equestrian centre in Beaudesert, and #55 000 to a wine
appreciation course at Ipswich Grammar School (Forshaw 2001).
Table 3 Distribution of the dairy industry restructure package
State
#million in 1998–1999 prices
% of Total
Average payment 
per farm (#000) Market milk Manufacturing milk Total
Vic 178 404 582 46.6 72
NSW 210 49 259 20.8 143
Qld 137 33 170 13.6 104
SA 72 28 100 8.0 134
WA 67 15 82 6.6 186
Tas 17 37 55 4.4 74
Total 681 567 1248
a NA NA
a Payments over eight years total #1.63 billion in current prices (Truss 2000).
Source: Senate Committee (1999).88 G. Edwards
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affected by deregulation. He said the Government was doing this following
a report by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics
(ABARE) that showed ‘... the decline in market milk prices has been
greater than many farmers expected, particularly in the former quota states
of NSW, Queensland and Western Australia’ (Truss 2001a). The package
provided #100 million to eligible dairy enterprises, with a cap of #60 000
per enterprise. Only people for whom market milk was more than 35 per
cent of total deliveries in 1998–1999 – that is, a sub-set of producers in the
quota states – were eligible for the supplementary payment. The package
included #20 million for expanding the DRAP and #20 million for discre-
tionary payments to those judged by the Dairy Adjustment Authority – the
body responsible for administering the adjustment package – to have
received rough justice in the initial allocation of adjustment funds. It was
revealed subsequently that the supplementary assistance package would be
funded by extending the consumer tax on milk for an estimated 7–10
months (Truss 2001b).
4. Some public policy issues
The focus here is not on the economic case for deregulating the dairy
industry. That case has been put by economists for decades (see e.g. Lloyd
1982 and references there, Industry Commission 1991a), most recently by
CIE (1999) in its NCP review of Victoria’s regulation of market milk.
Rather, the approach here is to think about the very large and highly
unusual adjustment package for the dairy industry from a public policy
perspective.
4.1 How sound was the case for adjustment assistance?
The ﬁrst point to be made is that the adjustment pressures consequent
upon deregulation need to be seen against the context of the adjustment
that the dairy industry has undergone under the regulatory regime of the
last several decades (see Table 4). The number of dairy farms fell by 70 per
cent in the last 30 years; more than 80 per cent in Queensland and South
Australia. The number of dairy cows fell nearly 40 per cent in the 1970s
and 1980s, and then increased 30 per cent in the 1990s. The average farm
herd increased from 92 in 1971 to 168 in 2000, with most of the increase
occurring in the 1990s. Average milk produced per cow almost doubled
from 1971 to 2000. Notwithstanding the concerns expressed about the
adjustment consequences of deregulation, the potential reduction in
number of dairy farms is much smaller than the reductions that occurred































































































































Table 4 Dairy farm numbers, herd size and production per cow
Number of dairy farms
Number of dairy cows 
(’000 head) Average farm herd
Average production 
(L per cow)
1971 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 1971 1980 1990 2000 1971 1980 1990 2000
NSW 7 735 3 601 2 220 1 725   654  311   238  289 97 97 99 168 2 257 2 870 3 602 4 811
Vic 18 991 11 467 8 840 7 806 1 271 1 045   968 1 377 98 102 118 176 3 263 3 012 3 920 4 989
Qld 8 123 3 052 1 970 1 545  492  247  201  195 73 82 92 126 1 707 1 984 3 122 4 370
WA 1 491  622  496   411  108   71   64   65 100 120 105 158 2 586 3 105 4 205 6 337
SA 3 836 1 730  969   667  149  103   89  105 75 77 87 157 3 406 3 163 3 934 6 800
Tas 3 117 1 522  901  734  160  103  92  139 73 79 105 189 2 922 2 958 3 791 4 379
Aust 43 293 21 984 14 728 12 888 2 833 1 882 1 654 2 170 92 96 109 168 2 609 2 848 3 781 5 000
Sources: Industry Commission (1991) and Australian Dairy Corporation (2001).90 G. Edwards
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that dairy farmers in particular states, especially the quota states, will
experience signiﬁcant pressure with deregulation – and would experience
more in the absence of the package.
10
Adopting another line of thinking, the question is especially pertinent
for manufacturing milk. Eight years notice was given of the end of price
supports for manufacturing milk. Giving notice of the end of a support
program is widely seen as obviating any case for providing recipients with a
quid pro quo for its removal. The Senate Committee inquiring into dairy
deregulation saw adjustment assistance in relation to manufacturing milk –
a little under half the total package (see Table 3) – as ‘inequitable, given
that the sunset of the DMS had been foreshadowed well beforehand’ (Senate
Committee 1999).
11
The case for adjustment assistance can be challenged for market milk
also, given the reasonable expectation that the end of DMS would presage
an end to Victoria’s incentive to prevent its milk ﬂowing across state borders.
The reason is that the end of the market-milk premium upon the termina-
tion of the support scheme for manufacturing milk in mid-2000 might have
been anticipated from the time of Simon Crean’s statement in April 1992.
Moreover, the dairy industry in Victoria, the predominant milk state, sup-
ported deregulation of the market-milk industry before it was known that
there would be an adjustment package.
4.2 Is a retail tax on milk an equitable way of funding assistance to 
dairy farmers?
Viewing the economic policy making process as a search for Pareto-
improvements (and near-Pareto-improvements) as Stiglitz (2000) and others
do, the idea that the consumers of milk who gain from deregulation-
induced price reductions should pay for the assistance that is necessary to
persuade milk producers to accept deregulation may seem attractive.
(Granted, the idea of providing assistance in this or other ways would be
more relevant if deregulation had come as ‘a bolt out of the blue’, an
unanticipated ending of milk producers’ property rights in state-provided
largesse, rather than with nearly a decade’s notice). Moreover, the notion
of government facilitating payment of producers by consumers for the
right to cease supporting them might be viewed as a corollary of Sieper’s
10 A broader perspective would reveal that some farmers who lose from deregulation of
milk marketing have gained considerably from developments outside the milk market,
including increases in the value of their land for hobby farm and residential purposes.
11 However, no Senator or Member argued in the parliamentary debate on the adjust-
ment package that assistance should be paid only in respect of market milk.Deregulation in dairy industry 91
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proposition – noted earlier – about governments facilitating transfers from
the politically weak to the politically strong.
12 As with the idea of the
search for Pareto-improvements, however, the corollary holds up less well if
notice of the end of a support policy has been given.
From the perspective of choosing the funding method for a politically-
determined payment to the dairy industry as part of a deregulation package,
economics offers no clear ‘scientiﬁc’ answer. Value judgements are likely to
prove more useful. The Senate Committee’s (1999) value judgement was
that the consumer levy was ‘opportunistic’: the Committee ‘was at a loss to
understand why consumers should fund the package’ (p. 167). Nevertheless,
it was a very different value judgement by senators and members that
informed the decision on funding the adjustment package, the legislation
ultimately receiving support from both sides of Parliament.
Perhaps the most problematical use of the regressive tax on milk consumers
is the funding of #65 million of projects in dairying regions through DRAP.
Along with many projects that provide counselling and exploration of devel-
opment possibilities for communities impacted by dairy deregulation, large
sums have been provided to private businesses. Examples are #27 000 for a
rabbit farm at Dungog, #220 000 for an eel nursery in the Beaudesert region,
#220 000 for a plastic moulding facility at Morwell and #770 000 for plant
upgrade at a Bega cheese factory.
13 There are fundamental questions about
the equity of milk consumers paying higher prices to make grants to
businesses such as these, as well as questions about the consistency of free
development money with efﬁcient investment decisions. There is also the
question ‘is it possible for the bucket of DRAP money to be allocated
consistently and without fear or favour?’.
The use of a consumer levy to fund assistance to dairy farmers upon
removal of their price supports gives rise to a fascinating question about
policy in other contexts. The question can be put starkly as follows: Would
there be support for a policy of reducing tariffs on motor vehicles, or on
textiles, clothing and footwear, and making payments to producers based
on their production in a recent past period, funded by taxes on consumers
of the items for, say, 8 years? If the answer is that a policy of this type is
12 In a political economy study of dairy industry policy from the introduction of the
Kerin Plan in 1986 to the legislating of the Crean Plan in 1992, Dwyer concluded that ‘no
single political economy theory appears to capture the Byzantine nature of dairy policy ...
The dairy industry appears to have continually adapted to the changing political landscape
and has used its resources effectively to try to achieve private interest outcomes for its
members.’ (Dwyer 1995).
13 Details of the allocations under DRAP are given on the web-site of the administering
agency, the Department of Transport and Regional Services, at: http://www.dotars.gov.au/
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appropriate for dairying but not for highly protected manufacturing indus-
tries, what is the reasoning behind the answer?
4.3 Was it disingenuous for the Government and ADIC to argue that 
the levy would not increase the retail price of milk?
‘The 11c per litre levy is not expected, of itself, to lead to increased milk
prices with deregulation’ (Truss 2000. See also ADIC 1999; Truss 1999).
Certainly, the removal of the regulated farm-gate price was expected to,
and did, reduce the retail price more than the levy increased it. But isn’t
the relevant counterfactual deregulation of the farm-gate price without a
consumer levy? Even though the ACCC found that supermarket prices for
plain milk fell by an average of 22 cents per litre (considering all pack sizes
and brands) in the ﬁrst 6 months of a deregulated market (ACCC 2001), a
much lower price could have been expected under deregulation without the
levy. Roughly speaking, each milk consumer will pay an extra #100 over
eight years due to the levy – #600 for a family of six – compared with deregu-
lation without the levy, and assuming the levy is fully passed on. (Given the
very low price elasticity of demand for milk it is reasonable to expect that
nearly all of the levy will be borne by consumers).
4.4 Is it reasonable to view the package of nearly $2 billion as 
‘adjustment assistance’?
Is the package better regarded as compensation for the loss of income due
to changes in policies that were known 8 years in advance in the case of
DMS, and a likely consequence of the ending of DMS in the case of
market milk? The Minister insists the money is to help farmers adjust to
the deregulated environment. However, no attempt has been made to target
assistance in accordance with the need for adjustment to ensure ﬁnancial
viability, or with a commitment to undertake adjustment initiatives.
14 The
requirement that farmers, or their advisers, go through a simple simulation
of their ﬁnancial situation under different assumptions about milk prices to
qualify for their payment provides no assurance that the money will be
used for efﬁciency-increasing purposes. Some farmers will use their payment
to reduce debt, increase the size of their farm, or install a more modern
dairy, all of which can be viewed as structural adjustment. Others will use
the money for consumption purposes.
14 For recent policy-oriented discussion of the provision of adjustment assistance see
Productivity Commission 1999b and 2001b. Deregulation in dairy industry 93
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It is not suggested that the freedom of farmers to use the funds from the
package as they choose is inappropriate on efﬁciency grounds. Moreover,
the lump-sum way in which the assistance is paid to farmers is consistent
with allowing freedom in its use. The question is not whether it would be
better to use adjustment-related criteria for targeting assistance, but
whether in the absence of such criteria, it would be more accurate to view
the payments as compensation?
15
4.5 Was the policy process used to develop the structural adjustment package 
a sound one?
Why did the Government rely so heavily on the peak policy body of the
dairy industry for advice on adjustment assistance? Was it reasonable to
expect ADIC to take a balanced view, giving serious consideration to
the interests of consumers? Why was the Productivity Commission, the
Government’s main adviser on microeconomic reform, not asked to report
on adjustment assistance for the dairy industry?
16
Taking a political economy view, perhaps the point that is most relevant
in thinking about these questions is the well-known weakness of the con-
sumer voice in comparison with that of producers. An important require-
ment of the Productivity Commission, like the Industry Commission and
the Industries Assistance Commission before it, is to ensure that a balanced
view is taken in considering policy reforms, with the impacts on no groups
neglected because of their lack of political clout. Did political imperatives
preclude a reference to the Productivity Commission on this occasion? It
would have been easier for the Government to make that judgement as a
result of the decision of the Australian Consumers’ Association (ACA
15 The Prime Minister, unlike his Minister for Agriculture, appears to answer this ques-
tion in the afﬁrmative. Responding to claims by One Nation leader Pauline Hanson that
dairy deregulation was a factor in the poor performance of the Coalition parties in the
Queensland election in February 2001, John Howard said, ‘Do you allow deregulation to
happen in a chaotic fashion or do you try and manage it with compensation, which we’ve
done’ (Howard 2001). According to the Productivity Commission, even the AFFA web-site
stated in October 2000 that the payments to farmers were ‘... to compensate them for reduc-
tions in their incomes’, as well as ‘to allow farmers to manage the transition to production
in a deregulated environment’ Productivity Commission (2000).
16 The Productivity Commission Act 1998  omits the requirement of the Industry
Commission Act 1989 that the Government obtains a report from the Commission before
making decisions on a range of industry assistance matters. However, it appears that a
report on the assistance package for the dairy industry would not have been mandated in
the Industry Commission era either because, under Section 11 (3) of the 1989 Act, ﬁnancial
assistance for an industry was exempted from the requirement of a report if the money was
raised by a tax on the industry.94 G. Edwards
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003
2000) not to treat the consumer tax on milk as a priority issue.
17 Interest-
ingly, too, the new Victorian Labor government gave dairy farmers the
opportunity to indicate their view on deregulation in a plebiscite, but did
not give a corresponding opportunity to milk consumers. The Victorian
Minister for Agriculture called the plebiscite an ‘exercise in agricultural
democracy’ (Hamilton 2000).
18
4.6 Why did the Commonwealth Government not require the State 
Governments to contribute to the adjustment package?
If the view is taken that a case for adjustment assistance can be made only
for market milk, it might be argued that the state governments should bear
the complete bill, because it is they that have been responsible for policy for
market milk. Moreover, the states were aware of the pressures that would
be exerted on the market-milk premium with the phasing out of the
Commonwealth’s DMS scheme, yet they chose not to reduce farmer prices
for market milk in anticipation of this. It is also relevant that the states have
received large amounts from the Commonwealth for their participation in
the NCP reforms. Why was this not viewed by the states, and especially the
Commonwealth, as an appropriate source of funds for any adjustment
assistance payments?
19
17 The ACA’s Annual Report 2000 did not mention dairy deregulation or the 11 cent a
litre levy.
18 The commitment to a plebiscite was made by the Labor Party before the Victorian
election. At that time there was no assistance package on offer. The prospects for consumer
gains from deregulation were therefore better and consumer support for deregulation presum-
ably stronger, than after the levy-funded assistance package was announced. By the time
the plebiscite was taken (December 1999), the assistance package had been announced. No
wonder that Victorian dairy farmers who, in the main, supported deregulation in the NCP
review without a package, voted overwhelmingly – 89 per cent of those voting (Truss 2000)
– for deregulation with the package. 
19 The behaviour of the Commonwealth might be likened to that of a parent who tells
his/her children that they are responsible for doing certain things, only to do them him/
herself when the children show no intention of doing them. This comparison seems especially
apt for the supplementary assistance package. In announcing that package in May 2001,
Warren Truss said, ‘The continuing refusal of the Queensland and NSW State Govern-
ments to provide compensation (sic) for removing the State-based milk price support
arrangements has forced the Federal government to once again step in to help those most
affected by deregulation’ (Truss 2001a). Notwithstanding Minister Truss’s criticism of the
states for their failure to provide compensation, he insisted that the Commonwealth’s
supplementary package, like the initial one, was ‘not about providing compensation or
income support. It is to help with adjustment by those farmers who are most in need,
thereby easing their transition to a deregulated market and providing wider public beneﬁts
to regional communities’ (Truss 2001b).Deregulation in dairy industry 95
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5. Concluding comment
The deregulation of the dairy industry on 1 July 2001 was a very important
microeconomic reform, removing arguably the worst remaining policy
failure in Australia’s rural sector.
20 The story of long-enduring and heavy
regulation in the industry, and of ultimate deregulation, is a complex one.
In thinking about the ‘why’ of regulation, there is no doubt that advisers
of governments in earlier times believed that farmers’ lack of market power,
the need to offset costs to farmers of mandating health safety standards for
table milk and of guaranteeing stable supplies at stable prices throughout
the year, the uncertainty about world prices, the existence of protection for
other industries, and the balance of payments constraint justiﬁed government
intervention in the dairy market. However, especially in recent decades,
when the level of understanding of microeconomic policy has been higher
and reforms made in industry policy and the foreign exchange market have
greatly weakened if not eliminated ‘second best’ arguments for assisting
particular industries, the political economy concept of industries ‘captur-
ing’ governments and persuading them to facilitate large transfers from
consumers – and, at times, general taxpayers – appears very relevant in
explaining the regulation. This is especially so of the state governments’
regulation of market milk. Until deregulation, the states showed little
interest in reducing the highly-supported market milk prices, or in alerting
farmers to the implications of the phasing out of the Commonwealth’s
DMS scheme, although they were aware of the likely resultant pressures on
market milk prices.
Why did deregulation come? The removal of regulation and assistance
for manufacturing milk occurred because through the Kerin plan – and
successor plans under subsequent Labor Agriculture Ministers Crean and
Collins – the dairy industry was subjected to a phasing out of its support
that was broadly consistent with the policy of the Hawke governments
for making industries in the tradeables sector face international market
realities. This policy involved a shift in the attitude of the federal govern-
ment away from helping the rent-seeking efforts of dairying and other
industries. It is harder to see such a change in the attitude of state govern-
ments implementing regulatory policies for market milk. Because I have
argued that even without NCP the demise of the Commonwealth’s DMS
scheme would have led Victoria to deregulate its market milk sector out of
20 The other main contender for this dubious honour is pricing and property rights for
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self-interest, it is clear to whom I award most plaudits for dairy deregula-
tion; John Kerin.
21
The questions raised in the previous section about the assistance package
that accompanied dairy deregulation may be useful in thinking about com-
pensation and adjustment in other contexts, including the remaining highly
protected areas of Australia’s manufacturing sector. Of particular interest is
whether the dairy industry model of ending price support and implementing
a consumer-funded assistance package could have a role in the motor vehicle
and textile, clothing and footwear industries.
In thinking about those questions, politics cannot be neglected. The votes
of dairy farmers and people dependent on associated value-adding activit-
ies have the potential to swing the outcome in several electorates around
Australia. This facilitated the very effective lobbying by the dairy industry,
especially through the ADIC, for the assistance package.
22 Dairy farmers in
Victoria, and elsewhere, gained from the washup in Canberra of the Kennett
Government’s loss of support in rural areas and its subsequent defeat. One
Nation, which has not-a-few supporters in dairying electorates, may have
been an important factor. Alistair Watson (2000) has suggested that every
dairy farmer say thank you by naming their favourite cow ‘Pauline’.
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